Abstract. Solving systems of m Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) equations in n variables is one of the main challenges of algebraic cryptanalysis. Although the associated MQ-problem is proven to be NP-complete, we know that it is solvable in polynomial time over elds of even characteristic if either m ≥ n(n − 1)/2 (overdetermined ) or n ≥ m(m + 1) (underdetermined ). It is widely believed that m = n has worst case complexity. Actually in the overdetermined case Gröbner Bases algorithms show a gradual decrease in complexity from m = n to m ≥ n(n − 1)/2 as more and more equations are available. For the underdetermined case no similar behavior was known. Up to now the best way to deal with the case m < n < m(m + 1) was to randomly guess variables until m = n.
Introduction
It is well known that algebraic equations can be an Achilles' heel for cryptographic systems. Whether stream ciphers [5, 13] , hash functions [19] or block ciphers [16] , they all can be expressed through a system of equations over anite eld F with a solution that yields the private key. For asymmetric schemes the importance is even more obvious. For example variants of McEliece [12] or Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) schemes such as Hidden Field Equations [11] were broken using algebraic techniques. So it is fair to say that solving systems of MQ equations is one of the main challenges of algebraic cryptanalysis. However, as the underlying MQ-problem is proven to be NP-complete [14] , we cannot hope to nd an ecient algorithm for all instances. In particular, if the number of equations m equals the number of unknowns n, all known empirical algorithms are exponential on random instances of the MQ-problem. Nevertheless we know that the problem becomes easy for elds of characteristic 2 if either m ≥ n(n − 1)/2 or n ≥ m(m + 1). In the rst case, we replace each monomial by a new variable and solve a linear system in n(n − 1)/2 equations and variables.
The second case is covered by an algorithm of Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin [15, Sec. 7] and will be further explored in this article.
Until now, research mainly covered the overdetermined case m ≥ n. There are many algorithms like F 4 , F 5 and XL that benet of additional equations [8, 9, 10] .
So for m = n even guessing one or two variables can help to reduce the complexity dramatically [2] and thus make a big dierence in practice. In contrast none of the algorithms benets in the same way of the underdetermined case n > m (cf. Section 1.1). In particular, their complexity is exponentially linked to the number of variables. Hence, having more variables will dramatically increase their running time (and also space requirements). As nding one solution often suces for cryptographic purpose, the best way of using more variables today, is to x them to random values and thus receive a hard instance with n = m and one solution on average. This is not very sophisticated and in a sense similar to throw away additional equations in the overdetermined case and only work with the remaining ones. This article shows how to us additional variables and hence closes the complexity gap between n = m and n ≥ m(m + 1). Our main result apply for elds of even characteristic. In section 6 we discuss a generalization to arbitrary characteristics.
Related Work
The best treatment of the overdetermined case m ≥ n is covered by XL or Gröbner bases algorithms like F 4 or its successor F 5 . The overall complexity is well understood [1] and becomes gradually easier if more and more equations are available. In particular for m ≥ n(n − 1)/2 over F 2 k and m ≥ n(n + 1)/2 over F p k for p an odd prime, the overall problem can be solved in polynomial time by Linearization. For the underdetermined case not much is known. Basically, all research so far has centered around two cases: n = m and n ≥ m(m + 1).
The rst has exponential, the latter polynomial time complexity. In particular, an algorithm from Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin [15, Sec. 7] can eciently solve the latter case in F 2 k . Courtois et al. [6] extended this result to arbitrary elds F p k and showed that the problem becomes polynomial as soon as n ≥ 2 m 7 (m + 1). Furthermore they showed how to eliminate log 2 ω variables and thus receive a system of m − log 2 ω variables and equations (cf. Prop. 1 in [6] ). We extend this result, using a tight analysis of the technique of Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin, to receive a system of m − ω + 1 variables and equations.
Achievement and Organization
We close an important gap in understanding the underdetermined case especially for F 2 k . In particular we show that there is a gradual change from exponential running time to polynomial running time if n gets larger than m. This improves the cryptanalysis of the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Signature scheme (UOV) [17] and therefore forces a change of parameter sets (cf. section 5).
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives some notation. Section 3 shows how to describe the transformation of variables we are using, shortly repeats the algorithm of Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin and introduce our new algorithm. Section 4 is the most important, as it gives a theoretical analysis of the correctness of our algorithm and also the one of Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin. Section 5 gives a complexity analysis and shows that parameters of UOV have to be increased. In section 6 we adapt our algorithm to the general case F p k for small ω and motivate future research on this question.
Notation
A MQ-system of equations over a nite eld F q with q elements is given by m equations
If we speak of solving such an MQ-system, we always mean nding one solution.
For cryptanalytic purposes, this is actually sucient in most cases. We call p (k)
as dened by (1) inhomogeneous. The homogeneous case consists only of terms in x i x j for 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n and is thus dened by
The corresponding MQ-map P :
To ease notation, we restrict to homogeneous systems in the sequel. Note that our algorithm also works for inhomogeneous systems without introducing a homogenization variable.
Let π (k) be the coecient vector of p
Note that our algorithm also works with other monomial orderings. However, for the ease of explanation, we have xed lexicographic ordering throughout this paper. The corresponding coecient matrix Π is dened by Π := π (1) , . . . , π
.
Transformation of Variables
Let P : F n q → F m q be an MQ-map with m equations and n = ωm variables x 1 , . . . , x n for some ω ∈ Q >1 . To make parts of the arguments easier, we will sometimes change to the notation n = m + v with v = (ω − 1)m. The current way to nd a solution of this system is to x v variables at random [2, 3, 7] and solve the remaining system of m equations and m variables using a MQ-solver such as F 5 or XL. Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin [15, Sec. 7] were the rst who took benet of the additional v variables and showed that the system is solvable in polynomial time for n ≥ m(m + 1). In a nutshell they applied a linear transformation S ∈ GL n (F q ) of variables to obtain a new MQ-system F := P • S with coecient matrix Φ. The transformation matrix S is calculated in polynomial time such that xing v variables in F provides a linear system in the remaining m variables for elds of characteristic 2. We will investigate this approach in more detail in section 3.2.
To understand how S operates on the coecients of P and F, we introduce the transformation Σ such that ΣΠ = Φ . This transformation was previously used to determine short key variants of UOV [18] .
3.1
How to Determine Σ We can write every equation
consisting of the coecients of p (i) .
Note that this matrix is not symmetric if F is of characteristic 2. Applying the change of variables, i.e. y = S −1 x, we obtain a new MQ-system F with f (i) = y S P (i) Sy for y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ). The coecients of this new map are determined
ij y i y j and
s ip y p . Comparison of coecients in the following equation reveals an explicit formula for Σ.
Let s i· ∈ F n q be the i-th row of S and D ij := s i· s j· the dyadic product of the i-th and j-th row of S. Now we can express x i x j by
be the ordered index set of all quadratic monomials. We have chosen lexicographic order of the monomials, i.e.
by collecting the appropriate entries of all the dyadic products. The matrix Σ, obtained by comparing coecients, maps the coecients of p
the number of monomials, this leads to
Algorithm of Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin
We briey explain the algorithm of Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin for n ≥ m(m + 1), cf. [15, Sec. 7] for details. In section 3.3 we will generalize this technique to n ≤ m(m+1) and show that we can force enough elements of Φ, i.e. coecients of F, to be zero, such that we obtain ( ω −1) linear equations. The rst idea is to split the variables y 1 , . . . , y n into two sets V := {y m+1 , . . . , y n } and O := {y 1 , . . . , y m }.
Here V denotes the set of variables we want to x and O the set of variables we want to determine. Due to the strong connection to the Oil and Vinegar
Signature Scheme, we call V the vinegar variables and O the oil variables. The aim of Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin was to nd S such that most coecients of F are zero and thus the new MQ-system is easily solvable e.g. by Linearization. The overall idea to nd such a linear transformation S eciently is the following. First all equations of (3) are quadratic in s ij . But if we x certain elements of S at random, some of the equations become linear. Solving this linear equations enable us to x some coecients of F to zero. More precisely Kipnis-PatarinGoubin aimed at solving the quadratic equations in s ij of (3) we obtain by
To ease notation we label (4) by (i, j, k) or just (i, j) if we want to denote all equations (i, j, 1) to (i, j, m). As all these equations are quadratic, KipnisPatarin-Goubin xed the rst column of S to random values. Note that regarding to (2) all monomials in equation (i, j) consists of one variable of the i-th and one variable of the j-th column of S. This means γ (k) 1,1 is xed to a random value and equations (1, 2) to (1, n) become linear. (1, 2) gives us m linear equations in the s i2 and after randomly xing the superuous variables, we can determine them such that γ (k) 1,2 = 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Now that the second column of S is determined, we obtain additional linear equations (2, 3) to (2, n). Using the 2m linear equations of (1, 3) and (2, 3), we can determine s i3 . If the rst k columns of S are determined, we solve the km linear equations (1, k + 1) to (k, k + 1) to determine the (k + 1)-th column of S. The algorithm continues until columns 1 to m of S are determined. At each level, more and more of the equations become linear. For the last step we have to solve the linear equations (1, m) to (m−1, m) in the unknowns s 1m to s nm and thus n ≥ m(m − 1) must hold. After this transformation we obtain m equations 1 ≤ j ≤ m of the form
The terms L i,j denote some linear functions in the V variables we want to x and Q j denotes some quadratic function in these variables. Now Kipnis-PatarinGoubin determined y m+1 , . . . , y m+v by Gaussian Elimination such that L i,j = 0 for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. This is possible for v ≥ m 2 and thus we obtain the condition n ≥ m(m + 1). For elds of characteristic 2 the remaining system in (5) is linear in the O variables and can thus be easily solved. This is due to the Frobenius Homomorphism x → x 2 which eectively allows us to treat monomials of the form y 2 i as linear variables.
In the next section we provide a tight analysis for n ≤ m(m + 1) and show that solving a MQ-system P with m equations and n = ωm variables is roughly as hard as solving a MQ-system of (m − ω + 1) equations in (m − ω + 1) variables.
3.3
Tight Analysis for n = ωm and Improvement
To obtain linear equations we also x the rst column of S at random. This step is similar to Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin. As we are in the case m < n < m(m + 1)
we cannot fulll all equations (4) and have to adjust our strategy accordingly. In particular, we have to reduce the number of equations during the intermediate steps, i.e. due to a lack of variables in S we can only solve equations (i, j, k) for some xed bound b j and 1
The overall process is depicted in gure 1. Remember, lines of Φ denote coecients and columns denote polynomials f Collect all linear equations (i, j, 1) to (i, j, ω).
5:
end for 6:
Solve them and include their solution to S. Collect all linear equations L1,i to Lm,i. 
Equivalent Solutions S and their Impact on b j
Up to this point our approach is a straightforward enhancement of KipnisPatarin-Goubin idea. This section covers the main idea of our approach and
gives new insights to the theory of solving underdetermined systems of equations. Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin claimed that all the linear equations provide at least one solution in general and that S is regular with high probability. Due to the large n this is actually true for their approach. But as we want to use as many s ij as possible to x elements in Φ to zero, it is not clear at all, how many equations γ (k)
i,j = 0 we are able to solve in order to obtain a regular solution S.
We use the theory of equivalent keys [20, 21] for the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar Scheme as a toolkit to show that for every solution S there is an equivalent solution S with a special structure. The number of variables in S will upper bound the number of equations γ (k)
i,j = 0 that yield a regular solution.
Equivalent Solutions
First let us determine b m and thus the number of zeros in Φ for n ≥ m(m + 1),
i.e. for the original algorithm of Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin.
0
(i, i) for i ∈ {1, . . . , m} (i, j) for i = j, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m} (i, j) for i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and j ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n} Denote S the subset of equations of ΣΠ = Φ labeled by (i, j) for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , m} and i = j, i.e. the zero part in gure 2. Let S be a solution to S. We call S an equivalent solution, if it preserves the structure of Φ, i.e. if S also fullls all equations of S. i,j = 0 for i = j, 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m. Note that Ω −1 has the same form as Ω, i.e.
Thus we are able to choose Ω −1 such that
(v×m) I (6) under the condition that
Note that this is always the case because S is regular and thus S (1) ||S (2) has full rank. As Ω
is just a diagonal matrix, we are only able to x the rst row in 
with Ω
(1)
a diagonal matrix. This leads to a minimal representative of every equivalence class of the form
I ,
where the rst row of S
Corollary 2. For n = ωm our approach pictured in gure 3 is upper bounded
Claim. We claim that corollary 1 as well as corollary 2 also yields a lower bound and thus are sharp. The crucial question is, if the SΩ −1 given by (6) or (7) is minimal for all columns i with V(B i ) = d i , i.e. we cannot nd a representative S with less free variables in those columns we are actually using all the free variables. This is the case, if these columns are uniquely dened for some generic Π. For xed columns 1 to (i − 1) this is obviously the case. Although intuitively clear, a rigorous mathematical proof seems to require stronger tools.
Nevertheless, experiments prove that there are no systematic dependencies and thus corollary 1 as well as corollary 2 are tight (cf. appendix 5).
The volume of the zero blocks B m+1 , . . . , B n in gure 3 is 
See gure 4 for illustration. This is possible as the number of coecients γ
. . .
. . . for 1 ≤ i ≤ (m/ ω ) equals the number of independent variables in the j-th column of S due to m = d j (cf. corollary 2). To eliminate the linear terms L i,j (cf. equation (5)) we have to solve ω (m − (m/ω)) = (ω − 1)m equations, which equals the number of variables and thus yields a solution. We obtain ω equations of the form (8) . Using the Frobenius Homomorphism several times x → x 2 p−1 over F 2 p leads to equation (8) .
After using equation (8) to eliminate ω variables in the remaining (m − ω ) equations we obtain a MQ-system of (m − ω ) variables and equations. Note that if m ω / ∈ N this very tight analysis fails and we are only able to eliminate ( ω − 1) instead of ω variables.
Complexity Analysis
The complexity of our approach is on the one hand the complexity of the pre- 
In the tight case of m ω ∈ N we have to solve (m − 1) systems of linear equations of dierent dimension to eliminate the O ×O coecients and another ( ω −1)m systems of dimension m to delete some of the O × V coecients. Deleting the remaining coecients using (5) requires solving another linear system of size
To determine the complexity of solving a MQ-system using F 5 we refer to [1] .
In a nutshell, we rst have to calculate the degree of regularity. For semi-regular sequences, which generic systems are assumed to be, the degree of regularity is the index of the rst non-positive coecient in the Hilbert series S m,n with
where d i is the degree of the i-th equation. Then the complexity of solving a zero-dimensional (semi-regular) system using
with 2 ≤ α ≤ 3 the linear algebra constant. We use α = 2 as the equations are sparse and to be comparable to the results of [2] , who gave the currently best attack against UOV. Table 1 give some examples of the complexity of our algorithm applied to attack UOV. The underlying eld is F 2 8 and nowadays parameters are n = 78 variables and m = 26 equations, i.e. ω = 3 [2] . We use the HybridF 5 algorithm and thus g denote the optimal number of variables to guess. Referring to table 1, we see that today's parameter of UOV are insecure (row with bold values). Based on our analysis, we suggest UOV with m = 28 for n = 3m. We have implemented our algorithm using the software system Magma V2.16-1 [4] and found it to be in line with the theoretical predictions. All experiments were performed on a Intel Xeon X33502.66GHz (Quadcore) with 8 GB of RAM using only one core. Table 2 compares the time complexities of the standard approach of guessing v variables and solve the remaining MQ-system in m variables and our algorithm for various parameter sets. The source code of our implementation can be found on the homepage of the rst author.
Odd Cases
In this section we outline some ideas to extend our results to elds of odd characteristic. Hence we are now working over F p k for some prime p = 2 and k ∈ N >0 .
Unfortunately there is no straightforward extension of our ideas. The main problem is that equations (8) are not longer linear and thus we are not able to eliminate variables in the remaining equations. Nevertheless, Gröbner algorithms are empirically faster on systems containing equations (8), but it is hard to quantify the gain from a theoretical perspective. An argument that this task is inherently dicult is also the odd-characteristic algorithm of Courtois et al. [6] . It extended the algorithm for even characteristics by Kipnis-Patarin-Goubin [15] to the odd case. However, it requires now n ≥ 2 m 7 (m + 1)which is infeasible in practice.
However, for small values of ω, we can actually adapt our algorithm from even to odd characteristics. This coincides with the cryptanalytically interesting case of UOV, where we have ω ≈ 3 for eciency reasons. Our main concern is to obtain some equations y i = g(y ω+1 , . . . , y m ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ ω and some polynomial function g of low degree from the ω equations given by (8) . They will be used to eliminate the variables y 1 , . . . , y ω . Therefore, we need to determine coecients (β ω+1,i , . . . , β m,i ) such that they are linearly dependent on (β ω+1,1 , . . . , β m,1 ) for every i ∈ {2, . . . , ω}. This way we could eliminate these parts in equations 2 to ω by Gaussian Elimination. Producing an upper triangular form on these equations leads to y 2 i = c i for 2 ≤ i ≤ ω, which is eciently solvable for nite elds of size p k . Still, the question remains how to determine the coecients β ij . Fixing γ (j) i,i = β ij to some value for 2 ≤ j ≤ ω leads to a quadratic system of (ω − 1) equations and variables s ij (cf. gure 1)so we seem to be back on square one. However, if ω is suciently small, i.e. smaller than 20, we can use any MQ-solver, such as Gröbner algorithms for this task.
Conclusions and Open Questions
In this article we showed a more gradual change between exponential running time in the determined case (n = m) and the polynomial running time in massively underdetermined case (n ≥ m(m + 1)). Previously, this change was abrupt (Kipnis-Goubin-Patarin), i.e. there was a polynomial time algorithm in one case, and a fully exponential algorithm in the other. The situation is depicted in gure 5. Our algorithm can be used as a general preprocessing step for further applications. Applied to UOV we would have to raise parameters from m = 26 to m = 28 in order to make the scheme secure.
